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THE DETERMINANTS OF THE CHOICE
BETWEEN FIXED AND FLEXIBLE
EXCHANGE-RATE REGIMES
ABSTRACT
In recent years, analysts and policy makers alike have been evaluating the nexus between
exchange rates and macroeconomic stability. Among the most important questions asked is why
have some countries adopted rigid, including fixed, exchange-rate regimes, while others have opted
for more flexible systems? This paper addresses this question from a political economy perspective,
both theoretically and empirically.
The model assumes that the monetary authority minimizes a quadratic loss function that
captures the trade-off between inflation and unemployment. This framework is initially applied to
the case where monetary authorities must choose between a (permanently) fixed and a flexible
exchange-rate regime. In selecting the regime, the authorities are assumed to compare the expected
losses under each scenario. The model is subsequently extended to cover the somewhat more
complicated case where the authorities must choose between fixed-but-adjustable and flexible
exchange-rate regimes. In this latter case, potential political costs of abandoning the pegged rate
are taken into account. In the empirical section, an unbalanced panel data set of 63 countries from
1980-1992 is used to estimate a series of probit models, with a binary exchange-rate regime index
as the dependent variable, Among the most important explanatory variables were measures of
countries’ historical degree of political instability, various measures of the probability of abandoning
pegged rates, and variables related to the relative importance of real (unemployment) targets in the
preferences of monetary authorities. The regression results support the political economy approach
developed in the theoretical discussion.
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In most developing and transitional economies, exchange rate issues have tended to
dominate macroeconomic policy discussions during the last few years. In particular, attention
has focused on two broad problems: first, how to define, measure, detect and correct situations of
real exchange i-atemisalignment and overvaluation; and second, on understanding the
relationship between nominal exchange rates and macroeconomic stability. Issues related to rea/
exchange rate misalignment have been central, for example, in debates that preceded the
devaluation of African currencies participating in the CFA franc zone in the early 1990s, in post
mortems of the Mexican crisis of December 1994, and in recent analyses of the Argentine
stabilization program of 1991.
Regarding the relationship between exchange rates and macroeconomic stability, four
specific questions have attracted the attention of analysts and policy makers:
(a) Why have some countries adopted rigid, including fixed, exchange-rate
regimes, while others have opted for more flexible systems?;
(b) Do fixed exchange-rate regimes impose an effective constraint on monetary
behavior and, thus, result in lower inflation rates over the long run?;
(c) Are exchange-rate-based stabilization programs superior to money-based
stabilization programs?; and,
(d) How should exchange-rate-based stabilization programs actually be designed’?
The first two issues deal with the long run, while the third one is related to the short run,
transitional consequences of stabilization programs. 1 All four issues, however, have important
implications for a country’s macroeconomic performance and growth. Moreover, most of these
questions are intimately related to political economy and institutional considerations.
This paper deals with the first question from a political economy perspective. I ask. for
example, why does Austria have a fixed exchange rate, while the U.K. has a flexible one’? And.
why has Argentina chosen a fixed exchange rate, while her neighbor Chile has a flexible-cum-
bands system? More generally, in December 1992, why did eighty-four countries (out of 167
reported in the IMF’s International Financial Statistics) peg their currencies to a major currency
‘ Bruno (1991) covers analytical issues related to questions b-c. See also Sachs (1996). On the selection
of exchange rate regimes see Corden (1994), Edison and Melvin (1990), and Isard (1995),or a currency composite? The theoretical discussion, presented in section II, emphasizes the role
of credibility, politics and institutions. In the empirical analysis (section III) I use a large cross-
country, panel data set to analyze empirically the determinants of the choice of regime.
II. The Political Economy of Exchange-rate regimes
In this section I develop a simple theoretical framework for analyzing the selection of
an exchange-rate regime. The analysis relies on the existence of a trade-off between
“credibility” and “flexibility”, and assumes that a pegged exchange-rate systern allows the
authorities to resolve, at least partially, the time inconsistency problem. I assume that policy
makers minimize a loss function defined over a monetary variable -- inflation -- and a real
variable -- say, unemployment. In order to simplify the discussion I initially assume that the
two alternative regimes are a flexible or a permanently fixed exchange-rate system. I then
extend the analysis to the case where the two options are a flexible regime or a pegged-but-
adjustable regime. In this case I assume that the abandonment of the pegged exchange rate
entails important political costs.
II. 1 Fixed or Flexible ? A Simple Framework
Assume, for simplicity, that the monetary authority must choose between two nominal
exchange-rate regimes: (permanently) fixed or flexible. Assume that the authorities take into
account the expected value of a loss function under the two alternative systems, Consider the
case where the loss function is quadratic and depends on inflation (n) squared and on squared
deviations of unemployment (u) from a target value (u*).* The model is given by equations (1)
through (5):
L= E(n2+p(u-u*)2); p>O.
u=u’-e( n-m) +~(x -x’); E(x) = X’,v(x) = 02.
2 This type of approach has been adopted, with some variants, by a number of authors
example, Persson and Tabel lini (1990), Devarajan and Rodrik (1992) and Frankel (1995).
(1)
(2)
See, foru* < u’ (3)
u = E(n) + aE(x - X’) (4)
(5) n=~d+(l-~)m.
Equation (1) is the loss function. Equation (2) states that the observed rate of unemployment
(u) will be below the natural rate (u’) if inflation exceeds wage increases -- (n-m)> O -- and if
external shocks (x) are below their mean (x’). Variable x can be interpreted as a composite of
terms of trade and world interest rate shocks. It is assumed to have a variance equal to 02.
Equation (3) establishes that the target rate of unemployment u* is below the natural rate u‘,
Equation (4) implies that agents are rational in setting wage increases (a< O), and equation (5)
defines inflation as a weighted average of the rate of devaluation d and the rate of wage
increases u. Under fixed rates d is by definition equal to zero, while under flexible rates the
authorities set d according to an optimal devaluation rule. 3
The model’s solution depends on the sequence in which decisions are made. Assume
that workers determine @ before they observe x, d or n. The government, on the other hand,
sets its exchange rate policy after both u and x are observed. The government’s objective is
to set its exchange rate policy so as to minimize the value of the loss function (1). The
solution in the case of fixed exchange rates is:
~=() (6.1)
(6,2) u=u’+~ (x-x’).
These results assume that the fixed exchange-rate system allows the government to solve its
credibility problem, by providing a precommitment technology.
3 A limitation of this approach is that it assumes that fixed rates are unchangeable. The case of a
pegged but adjustable regime can be handled assuming that the fixed rule has escape clauses, See Flood
and Isard (1989).The solution is slightly more complicated under flexible exchange rates. In this case
the authorities have to determine the optimal, exchange-rate adjustment rule. The final
solution for d, n and u under flexible exchange rates are given by:
d=-A{~2( l+62p)6p (u*-u’)-p6~ $(X-X’)}, (7.1)
~flex = ~fixed -6p(u*- u’)+ p2pe~A (x-x’), (7.2)
Uflex = Ufixed -~3$A (x-x’). (7.3)
where, A = [~’ ( 1 + p (32, -~ ]-1, which under most plausible conditions is greater than
zero, Equation (7.2) establishes that due to the unemployment objective, inflation under
flexible rates will tend to exceed its equilibrium level under fixed rates. That is, if the
unemployment objective is important in the loss finction, the authorities will be tempted to
“overinflate”. On the other hand, unemployment under flexible rates will be higher (lower)
than under fixed rates if there are negative (positive) external shocks.
In selecting the exchange-rate regime, the authorities will compare the expected value of
the loss function under both regimes:
K = E { Lflex- Lfixed},
If K >0, a fixed exchange-rate
(8)
regime will be adopted. It is easy to see that K is equal to:
K = E { (n””)’ + p (uflex- u“)’ - p (ufix’d- u“)z } (9)
This expression is intuitively appealing. It states that the selection of the exchange-rate regime
will depend on the square of inflation under flexible rates -- remember that inflation is zero in
the fixed rate regime --, and on the difference between the squared deviations ofunemployment from their respective targets. After some manipulations equation (9) can be
rewritten as:
K = (6 p)z (U* -U’)2 - y 02, (lo)
where y is a positive function of A, ~, p, O and $. For K to be positive, and thus for fixed
rates to be preferred, the country’s “employment ambition” -- measured by (u* - u‘) -- has to
be “large enough”. More specifically, it has to exceed the variance of the external shocks.
On the other hand, if 02 is high enough, K can be negative indicating that flexible rates are
preferred. This would allow the authorities to reduce the deviation from its unemployment
target, An important question in the empirical evaluation of this (and related) models is how
to measure the degree of “ambition” of the authorities’ unemployment target -- (u* - u‘). I
take up this issue in section III.
II.2 Flexible vs. Pegged-but-Adjustable Excltange-rate regimes
The preceding analysis assumed that under a fixed regime the nominal exchange rate
would never be altered. This is, of course, a major simplification. In reality, under fixed
exchange rates, governments always have the choice of abandoning the peg. This possibility can
be captured formally by assuming that the authorities follow a rule with some kind of escape
clause. In other words, the nominal exchange rate will be maintained at its original level under
certain circumstances. However, if these circumstances change markedly, the peg will be
abandoned. This means that at any moment in time there is a positive probability that the pegged
rate will be altered. This type of arrangement underlied the original Bretton Woods system that
ruled the international monetary system from 1948 to 1973. According to the original IMF
Articles of Agreement, a country could alter its peg if it was facing a “fundamental
disequilibrium”. In this section I sketch the analytics of this case.
Assume that ex ante a country can choose between two possible regimes: flexible nominal
rates (f) or pegged but adjustable rates (p). Also consider a two-period economy, where under apegged regime there is a positive probability that the peg will be abandoned at the end of the first
(or beginning of the second) period. The probability of abandoning the peg is denoted by q, and
the discount factor by ~. As in the preceding analysis, assume that the authorities have a distaste
for both inflation and for deviations of unemployment from a target level.
Assume further that the authorities will incur a political cost equal to C if the peg is
indeed abandoned. This assumption captures the stylized fact, first noted by Cooper (1971), that
stepwise devaluations have usually resulted in serious political upheaval and, in many cases, in
the fall of the government.4 The magnitude of this cost will, in turn, depend on the political and
institutional characteristics of the country, including the degree of political instability. In
politically unstable countries a major economic disturbance, such as the abandonment of a parity
that the authorities have promised to defend, will tend to have major political consequences. For
example, this can explain why the vast majority of stepwise devaluations take place during the
early years of an administration, when its degree of political popularity is higher.~ The degree of
political instability will also affect the government’s discount factor. In more unstable countries
the authorities will tend to be more impatient, discounting the future more heavily. This means
that denoting the degree of political instability
c = c(p);
P = P(P);
by p, we can write:
with C’ > 0, (11)
with ~’ < 0. (12)
In this two period economy, the loss function under flexible rates is (where the notation is
consistent with that used in the
4 Cooper reports that more
previous section):
than two thirds of the finance ministers that engineered the devaluations lost
their jobs within two months of the devaluation. See also Edwards (1994),
5 Using a broad sample of stepwise devaluations, Edwards (1994) found that in presidential democracies
77% of the devaluations took place within the first 18 months of new governments; this figure is 70% for
parliamentary democracies, and only 43% for undemocratic regimes.Lfl’x= y(n’)z + ~(UF-U*)2 + ~ (y (nF) (+12+ p [(UF),+L-U*]2), (13)
where y is a parameter that captures the degree of distaste for inflation.
The loss function under a pegged rate regime is:
Lpegged = y (np )2 + p (Up-U*)2+ ~ {(1-q)(y(np)L+12 + jA[(UP)L+l -U*]2) +
+ q (y (nD),+12+ p [(uD),+l - U*]2) + qc}, (14)
where the superscript D refers to the value of a specific variable in the second period, under
the devaluation scenario. If the escape clause is exercised and the peg abandoned, we assume
that the country moves into a flexible regime. That is, once the peg is abandoned, inflation
and unemployment in the second period will be determined as under a flexible system. b
In order to simplify the discussion and concentrate on the selection of the exchange-rate
regime, I do not specify explicitly the process governing the decision to use the escape clause.
As in equation (8) in the preceding section, the regime decision rule will be based on an ex
ante comparison between both loss functions:
K = E {LfleX - LPegged}, (15)
If K>O, then the pegged but adjustable regime is preferred. Some simple manipulation yields:
K = y(~F)2 + p [(KF)2-(KP)2] ~ ~ (]-q) Y(7CF)L+I 2 +
+ ~ (1-q) P [(KF), +l 2- (Kp), +l 2]- q~c. (16)
b The rate of inflation will be higher under pegged-but-adjustable regime than under the (unrealistic)
“forever” fixed system considered in section II. 1. This is because under pegged regimes the public’s expected
rate of inflation (in period 2) will explicitly take into account the probability that the peg will be abandoned:
E(i’cp),+l = q (nD),+, + (1 - q) (rip),+].Where (K’)2= (UF- u*) 2 and (Kp) 2= (up - U*)2. From the analysis in the previous section it
follows that [(KF)2- (Kp)2]<0 and that [(K’),+, 2- (K’),+] 2]< O. From equation(16) it is
possible to derive a number of hypotheses regarding the likelihood of a country choosing a
pegged-but-adjustable exchange-rate regime. A higher rate of inflation under flexible rates (in
either period) will increase the likelihood of a pegged regime being chosen. Moreover, with
other things given, a higher weight for inflation in the loss function -- that is a higher y -- will
also increme the probability of choosing a pegged exchange rate, On the other hand, an increase
in unemployment volatility under pegged rates, generated by a higher variance in the foreign
shock -- a higher u’, from the previous section -- will increase the likelihood that a flexible
system will be selected. A greater distaste for unemployment deviations -- that is a higher p --
will reduce the likelihood of selecting a pegged rate. Likewise, a higher cost of abandoning the
peg (C) will reduce the ex ante probability of selecting a pegged rate. Interestingly enough, a
higher probability of abandoning the peg -- a higher q -- will have an ambiguous effect on the ex
ante likelihood of choosing a pegged regime. This follows from the following expression:
K~= -~ y (nF)[+, 2- ~ p [( KF)t+l 2- (Kp),+, 2]- PC (17)
Notice that the presence of political costs of abandoning the peg (C) increases the likelihood
that this expression will be negative, making it more likely that a flexible regime will be
selected.
An important question relates to the relationship between political instability and the
selection of the exchange-rate regime. In principle there will be two offsetting forces. First, a
higher degree of political instability will increase the cost of abandoning the peg -- recall
equation (11) -- and thus will reduce the ex ante probability that a pegged regime will be
chosen. Second, a higher degree of instability will increase the authorities discount rate
(equation 12), reducing the importance of “the fiture” in their decision making process.
Formally:K, = - ~qC’ + KO~’. (18)
While the first term is negative; the second can be either positive or negative, because the sign of
KPis indeterminate. This means that the way in which instability will affect the selection of an
exchange-rate system is an empirical question. I tackle this issue in the following section, where
I present the results of a number of probit regressions on panel data for 63 countries during 1980-
1992.
111. Empirical Results
In this section I use a cross-country, unbalanced panel data set from 1980-1992 to
analyze why some countries have adopted pegged exchange-rate regimes while others have
opted for more flexible systems. I estimate a number of probit equations to investigate
whether, among other factors, a country’s political and economic structure, including its
degree of political instability, its degree of openness, and the variability of export earnings,
help explain the selection of an exchange-rate regime. Two classes of independent variables
were used in the analysis: the first attempts to capture long term structural characteristics --
both political and economic --of these countries, and are assumed to change very slowly over
time. In the empirical analysis they are defined as an average for the decade prior to the one
included in the analysis. The second class of independent variables tries to capture, for each
country, the evolution of some key time series (see below for a discussion on how each
variable is actually defined).
Probit equations of the following type were estimated using an unbalanced panel data
set for 63 advanced and developing countries (see the appendix for the list of countries):
pegi, = ~7Pi + k’ QiL+ ~’ Ri[.l + Ei~, (19)
where subindexes i and t refer to country i in year t. Peg is an exchange-rate regime index
defined below. p, 1 and $ are parameter vectors; P are variables specifying national political10
and economic characteristics. In order to avoid simultaneity problems these variables were
defined, in most cases, as averages for the previous decade (1970-1980). See the discussion
below for details. Q and R are variables (economic and structural) for which panel data are
available; while the Qs are timed at period t, the Rs are lagged one (or more) periods. This is,
mostly to reduce the pitfalls of simultaneity problems.
III. 1 Data
The empirical analysis poses some difficult data challenges. Chief among them are: (a)
classifying the broad variety of exchange-rate systems observed in the real world into two
broad categories -- pegged and flexible--; (b) measuring political instability; and (c) defining
measures of the authority’s incentives for “tying its own hands. ”
Defining exchunge-rate regimes
The ~F’s International Financial Statistics classifies countries according to their
exchange-rate system in three broad groups: (a) Countries whose currency is pegged either to
a single currency or to a currency composite. (b) Countries whose exchange-rate system has
limited flexibility “in terms of a single currency or group of currencies”. This group includes
a rather small number of countries that have adopted a narrow band, including those in the
ERM. In June of 1991, for example, only eleven countries were listed in this group. And (c),
countries with “more flexible” exchange-rate systems. This group includes countries where
the exchange rate is adjusted frequently according to a set of indicators, countries that float
independently and countries with “other managed floating” regimes.
In the empirical analysis presented in this paper, countries are classified according to
their exchange-rate regime in a binary fashion as “pegged” or “flexible”. A difficulty with
this approach, however, is that it is not entirely clear how the middle group -- that is nations
which according to the IMF have “limited flexibility ”-- should be classified. In order to deal
with this issue I have used two altermtive classifications. The first one considers as having a
pegged exchange-rate system only those countries classified by the IFS as such. Thus, a
variable pegl that takes a value of one for those countries, and zero for countries with “limited11
flexibility” and “more flexible” regimes was defined. The second classification considers as
having a pegged regime those countries classified as such by the IFS, plus those with
“flexibility limited in terms of a single currency or group of currencies”. Variable peg2, then,
takes a value of one for “pegged” and “limited flexibility countries” and zero for those nations
with a “more flexible” regime.
Measuring Political InstabiliQ
Most empirically-based political economy studies have used rather crude measures of
political instability, including the number of politically motivated assassinations and attacks
(Barro 1991). Other studies have used the frequency -- either actual or estimated --of
government change as a measure of political turnover and instability (Cukierman et al. 1992). A
limitation of this type of measure, however, is that it treats every change in the head of state as an
indication of political instability, without inquiring whether the new leadership belongs to the
same, or opposing, party than the departing leader. In that sense, for example, the replacement of
a prime minister by another from the same party is considered to have the same meaning as a
change in the ruling p~y (Cukierman 1992).
In this paper I use two alternative measures of political instability. The first, POLINST,
corresponds to the most traditional approach, and is defined as the estimated frequency of
government change for 1971-1980. This variable has been used by Cukierman et al (1992). This
variable is measured for 1971-1982, and is assumed to capture the inherent degree of political
instability of each country. The second measure, POLTRAN, is a new index of political
instability that focuses on instances where there has been a transfer ofpower from a party or
group in office, to a party or group formerly in the opposition, also between 1972 and 1980.7
This index measures the instability of the political system by capturing changes in the political
leadership from the governing party (or group, in the case of non-democratic regimes) to an
opposition party. In constructing this index, a transfer of power is defined as a situation
where there is a break in the governing political party’s (or dictator’s) control of executive
7 The meritsof this typeof indexwere firstdiscussedin EdwardsandTabellini(1994).12
power. More specifically, under a presidential system a transfer of power would occur if a
new government headed by a party previously in the opposition takes over the executive.
Under a parliamentarian regime, a transfer of power is recorded when a new government
headed by a party previously in the opposition takes over, or when there are major changes in
the coalition so as to force the leading party into the opposition. However, when the
goverting coalition remains basically unaltered, even if the new prime minister belongs to a
party different from that of the outgoing prime minister, a transfer of power is not recorded.
Finally, in the case of single-party systems, dictatorships or monarchies, a transfer of power
only takes place if there are forced changes of the head of state. Appointments of a successor
by an outgoing dictator (as in Brazil during the 1970s) are not recorded as transfers of power.
As in the case of POLINST, this variable has a single value for each country, corresponding to
the period 1971-1980. By concentrating in the period immediately preceding the one used in
the probit analysis, potential endogeneity problems are reduced.
In addition to the two indexes of political instability, three indicators were used as
proxies of the extent of weakness of the government in office. The first one refers to whether
the party or coalition of parties in office have the absolute majority of seats in the lower house
of parliament, In any given year this indicator, called MAJ, takes a value of zero if the party
(coalition) does not have majority; it takes a value of one if it has majority; and takes a value
of two if the system is a dictatorship. A higher value of MAJ, then, reflects a stronger
government. In the cross-country regression the average of MAJ over 1971-1980 was used.
The second indicator of political weakness that we used is the number of political
parties in the governing coalition (NPC). This index takes a value of zero for monarchical or
dictatorial systems, and the number of parties participating in ruling coalitions under
democratic regimes (that is, if there is a single-party government NPC will take the value of
one). It is expected that the higher the number of parties in that coalition, the higher the
probability of conflict of interest across ministries and, thus, the higher tie reliance on the
inflation tax. The third indicator of government weakness is whether the government is a13
coalition government or a single-party government (COAL). This index takes a value of zero
for dictatorships, a value of one for single-party governments and a value of two for coalition
governments.
Other Data
According to the model presented in section II, in addition to the political factors
discussed above, other variables that capture structural characteristics of an economy are
important in the process of selecting an exchange-rate system.
External shocks. Two alternative indices were used to measure the extent of external
shock variability. (a) A coefficient of variation of real export growth for 1970-1982, denoted
as CVEX, was constructed with raw data obtained from the IMF’s International Financial
Statistics (IFS). (b) A coefficient of variation of real bilateral exchange rate changes for 1970-
1982, EXVAR, was constructed from data obtained from the IFS. The use of these variables
in the regression amlysis presents a potential endogeneity problem. In order to minimize this
danger in the probit reported below, lagged values (for 1970-82) of these indexes were used.
It is expected that the coefficient of these variables in the probit regressions will be negative,
indicating that, as reflected in equation (10), countries with a more volatile external sector will
tend to select a more flexible regime.
In principle, the actual importance of external shocks should also depend on the degree
of openness of the economy -- more open countries are more “vulnerable” to external
disturbances, In order to consider this effect I added an interactive term between external
variability and the degree of openness, denoted as VAR_OPEN. The latter was defined as the
ratio of imports plus exports to GNP, and was constructed from data obtained from the IFS.
Degree of “Ambition” of the unemployment target: A cornerstone of the model
developed above -- and of most Barre-Gordon types of model -- is the idea that countries with
a very “ambitious” real (that is, unemployment) objective will have an incentive to “tie their
own hands”, in order to solve their credibility problem. That is, with other things given, they
will have a greater incentive to select a pegged exchange-rate system. It is not easy, however,. . .
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to measure empirically this degree of” ambition”. In particular, only a handful of countries
have data on unemployment. For this reason I have used lagged, average real rates of growth
of GDP (for 1970-1980) as a proxy for the countries incentives to “tie their own hands”. I
assume that, with other things given, countries with a historically low rate of growth will be
more tempted to “overinflate” as a way to accelerate growth, even in the short run. If this is
the case, then low growth countries will have an incentive to “tie their own hands” as a way to
avoid falling into this temptation. It is expected that the coefficient of GROWTH will be
negative in the probit regressions. Naturally, the use of growth as a regressor raises the
possibility of endogeneity. It is indeed possible that the exchange-rate regime will, per se,
affect economic performance, including growth. In order to avoid this problem I use lagged
averages (by one decade) of growth rates in the estimation of the probit models (19). To the
extent that this variable tries to capture the historical and structural incentives faced by a
country to tie its authorities’ hands, the use of lagged averages is, indeed, appropriate.
Probability of abandoning rhepeg, (or abili~ of maintaining it): As discussed in the
preceding section a higher probability of abandoning the peg -- a higher q -- can, in principle,
affect the likelihood of selecting a pegged rate either positively or negatively. Since it is not
possible to observe q directly, four variables that capture the probability of having a
devaluation were considered in the empirical analysis: (a) the historical rate of inflation.
Countries with a history of rapid inflation will tend to have a greater propensity to devaluing.
This variable is defined as the average for 1970-80. (b) The yearly lagged ratio of
international reserves to high powered money. Higher reserves reduce, with other things
given, the probability of abandoning the peg. This variable was defined, for each country and
each year as the one-year lagged ratio of central bank’s reserves to monetary base. (c) rate of
growth of domestic credit. Countries with a higher rate of growth of domestic liquidity will
have a lower ability to sustain the peg. This variable was constructed from data obtained from
the IMF, and was defined as a five year moving average. (d) Index of capital controls. In
principle, with other things given, a country with more extensive capital controls will tend to15
have a smaller probability of devaluing. Variables representing capital controls were taken
from Alesina et al. (1994). Notice that according to equation (17), in spite of the theoretical
ambiguity of the effect of a higher q on the selection of the exchange regime, in countries with
a high political cost of devaluing, a higher q will reduce the likelihood that a pegged regime
will be adopted.
In addition to the variables of political instability, external shocks, and the probability
of devaluing, the log of income per capita (PCGDP) measured in 1989 dollars was included in
the analysis. This variable was taken from the World Bank’s World Development Report.
More advanced countries tend to have a greater degree of intolerance for itiation. Also, it
has often been claimed that less advanced countries do not have the institutional and
administrative ability to implement a flexible exchange-rate regime. On both counts, its
coefficient should be positive. 8
III. 2 Results
Tables 1 and 2 contain the main results from the probit analysis. The estimates in table
1 were obtained when pegl was used as the dependent variable; those in table 2 correspond to
peg2. Table 3, on the other hand, contains the results obtained when ordy developing
countries were included in the sample. Overall these results are very satisfactory and provide
broad support for the model developed in the preceding section. Surprisingly, perhaps, there
are few differences in the estimates obtained when the alternative definitions of dependent
variables were used.
The estimates obtained when the strict definition of pegged regime @egl) was used,
reported in table 1, will be discussed first. They strongly suggest that the structural degree of
political instability plays an important role in the selection of the exchange-rate regime -- more
unstable countries have, with other things given, a lower probability of selecting a pegged
exchange-rate system. The consistent negative coefficient of this variable indicates that
empirically the direct effect of a higher political cost of devaluing offsets the effect via a
n See Aghevli et al (1991). For a critical view see Collins (1994).16
higher discount rate on the authorities’ decision-making process. Interestingly enough, the
coefficient is larger -- as is the marginal contribution of the variable -- when the more polished
measure of instability POLTRAN is used. Two of the indexes of the degree of weakness of
the political system (NPC and COAL) are not significant; MAJ, on the other hand, is
marginally positive, suggesting that stronger governments will have a greater tendency toward
selecting a pegged system. The intuition here is quite simple: stronger governments will be in
a better position to withstand the political costs of a (possible) currency crisis and, thus, will
be more willing to adopt them.
The coefficients associated with the (lagged) indexes of external volatility -- EXVAR
and CVEX -- are also negative, as expected, and significantly so. What is particularly
interesting is that the coefficients of the interactive term between external variability and
openness (VAR_OPEN) are significantly positive. This suggests -- somewhat puzzling -- that
as countries are more open, the importance of the external disturbance in deciding the selection
of the exchange rate regime loses importance.
The estimated coefficients of the variables that capture the ability to maintain the peg
have the expected sign and are also significant at conventional levels. The coefficient of
lagged inflation is significantly negative, suggesting that countries with a history of inflation
will have a lower probability of maintaining the peg, and will thus tend to favor the adoption
of a more flexible system. Along similar lines, the coefficients of lagged credit creation are
also negative. The lagged coefficient of central bank international reserves to base money
(RESMONEY) is significantly positive in all regressions, indicating that countries with lower
holdings of international reserves will have a lower probability of adopting a pegged exchange-
rate regime. There is, however, a potential endogeneity problem: it is possible that countries
that have decided to adopt a flexible rate regime will “need” a lower stock of reserves. The
use of one-year lagged values of the reserves ratio reduces, however, the extent of this
problem.17
The estimated coefficient of the historical rate of growth of GDP is significantly
negative indicating that, with other things given, countries with a lower growth rate will tend
to prefer a more rigid exchange-rate regime. To the extent that historical growth is a good
proxy for the “temptation to inflate”, this result can be interpreted as providing evidence in
favor of the “tying its own hands” hypothesis. Countries with poorer performance --
measured, in this case, by the historical rate of growth --will have a greater incentive to
renege on their low inflation promises and, thus, will benefit from adopting a more rigid
exchange-rate system, In order to analyze the robustness of these results I used the yearly
difference between the rate of unemployment and its long term historical average (1970-90)
an alternative measure of the “temptation to inflate”. Within the context of the credibility
view it would be expected that the estimated coefficient of this variable will be positive. A
limitation of this measure, however, is that very few countries have data on unemployment.
as
For this reason, the results obtained from these estimates should be interpreted with caution.
In equation I of table 1, when the differential in unemployment was substituted for the rate of
GDP growth, its coefficient was positive, as expected (O.113), and significant (t-
statistic =2.65).9
Finally, the coefficient of log of per capita income is significantly negative, indicating
that, to the extent that the adoption of a flexible regime requires sophisticated institutions,
more advance countries will have a tendency to select more flexible rates, This result,
however, is highly influenced by the way in which the industrial countries -- and in particular
the ERM nations -- are classified.
Table 2 summarizes the results obtained when peg2 was used as the dependent variable
To a large extent these results confirm those reported in table 1. With other things given, the
degree of structural political instability affects negatively the probability of selecting a pegged
exchange rate. The positive coefficient of
9 The number of observations in this case
income nations.
NPC is, however, somewhat puzzling since it
wasordy280. Mostcountriesinthis reducedsamplehigh-18
suggests that countries with broader political coalitions -- and, in principle, with a weaker
political base will tend to favor a pegged exchange rate. The interpretation of the coefficients
on external volatility and on the ability to maintain the pegged rate are very similar to that of
table 1. In this case, however, the coefficient of the log of per capita income is positive and,
in two of the five equations, significantly so. This sign switch is mostly the result of the fact
that in peg2 many advanced countries have been classified as having a pegged rate. In table 3
the sample has been restricted to developing countries. The results largely support those
obtained for the broader sample.
An important policy question refers to the relationship between capital and exchange
controls, on the one hand, and the selection of the exchange-rate regime on the other. In
principle, countries with capital controls will have a greater ability to sustain a pegged rate.
Table 4 contains results from probit regressions that include measures of capital controls as
independent variables. Since ordy a subset of the countries in the original sample have data on
capital restrictions, the sample is rather smaller. These binary indexes, taken from Alesina et
al. (1994), were defined as follows: (a) CAP1 receives a value of one when a country has
restrictions on capital account transactions; (b) CAP2 receives a value of one when restrictions
on current account transactions are present; and (c) CAP3 equals one when multiple currency
practices are in effect . As can be seen, the results are quite interesting. Ordy the index on
restrictions on capital account transactions is significant, and positive in every estimate, This
suggests that countries that impose restrictions on capital account transactions have a tendency
to select a pegged regime. Also, the results suggest that once the existence of restrictions on
capital account transactions are considered, other types of restrictions do not play a major role
in the process of selecting the exchange-rate regime. The other results in table 4 continue to
support, however, the main findings regarding the role of political and economic variables in
the exchange rate selection process.19
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pegl as Dependent Variable’































































































































N 832 832 832 832 873
Y2 283.8 278.0 328.7 288.0 284.6
‘ Of the 832 observations in regressions I-IV, in 445 the value ofpegl was Oand in 387 it
Wasl.Table 2. Probit Regression Resdts:
peg2 as Dependent Variable































































































































N 818 818 818 818 860
X2 186.8 170.7 166.1 207.17 188.5Table 3. Probit Regression ResuIts for Developing Countries:
pegl andpeg2 as Dependent Variables

































































































































N 566 566 593 552 552
X2 182.6 213.7 186.5 160.1 188.21Table 4. Probit Regression Results with Capital Controls:
peg] as Dependent Variable




























































































































N 541 541 541 541
Y* 187.2 209.3 211.6 213.6